The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the "fair share guaranteed" property.
independent of the consumption bundle. There are many examples of package assignment problems, both simple and meaningful, for which market equilibrium does not exist. A very important sub-class of package assignment problems is the socalled "combinatorial allocation problem". Fair allocations for combinatorial allocation problems and the fact that they do not satisfy most properties suugested for such problems have been discussed in Bevia (1998) . In a combinatorial allocation problem there is exactly one unit of each indivisible object that is available for distribution. Keslo and Crawford (1982) postulate a gross substitutability condition that is sufficient for the existence of market equilibrium in combinatorial allocation problems. Gul and Stacchetti (1997) show that if individual willingness to pay functions exhibit a no-complementarities condition, then again a market equilibrium exists for the same class of problems. Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) show that the aggregate willingness to pay for the combinatorial allocation problem coincides with the optimal value of the corresponding relaxed problem if and only if there is a market equilibrium. This result can be extended to the entire domain of package assignment problems. More recently, Lahiri (2006) shows that a market equilibrium for a package assignment problem exists if and only if the aggregate willingness to pay function is "locally concave" at the initial endowment. Given the distinct possibility of market equilibrium not existing, the question that was posed by Wurman and Wellman (undated) was whether there is an equilibrium for which instead of a fixed unit price for each commodity there was a price associated with each consumption bundle. The answer to this question was in the affirmative. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) show that given any feasible non-monetary allocation that maximizes the aggregate willingness to pay, i.e. an efficient nonmonetary allocation, there are pricing functions one for each agent that is compatible with each agent rationally choosing the consumption bundle assigned to it by the nonmonetary allocation. Issues concerning equitable allocations in a package assignment problem have rarely been raised, since it was realized that the theory of fair allocations is substantially similar to the equilibrium theory. In Moulin (1995) can be found a remarkable result that obtains the existence of fair allocations for package assignment problems as a corollary of the corresponding existence result for assignment problems. However the proof that is available in Moulin (1995) states something much stronger: given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a vector of transfers, so that the resulting allocation is fair. Since in a package assignment problem an efficient non-monetary allocation always exists the stated result in Moulin (1995) follows from this other stronger result (also due to Moulin (1995) ) that we present here as Proposition 1. Using Proposition 1 it is easy to show that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is pricing function defined on consumption bundles (and common to all agents) that is compatible with each agent rationally choosing the consumption bundle assigned to it by the non-monetary allocation. This is the second result of this note. Proposition 1 was definitely known and Proposition 2 can be easily recognized. Hence the only token contribution that the presentation of the first two results make is to put in writing a proof of Proposition 2 (which as stated is stronger than the corresponding one in Wurman and Wellman (undated)) using Proposition 1.
In the context of division of infinitely divisible and homogeneous resources, it often happens that envy free allocations may often lead to inequitable distribution of surplus. For instance as shown in Moulin (1995) , in any two agent fair division problem with one agent having linear and strictly increasing indifference curves and the other having Cobb-Douglas preferences, at the market equilibrium from equal division the agent with linear indifference curves is exactly as well off as she would be under equal split, where as the other agent may ascend to a higher level of satisfaction. Since market equilibrium from equal division is fair, this in-egalitarian distribution of surplus above equal division does little credit to the concept of envy freeness. An alternative solution concept by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) , often remedies such inequities. The solution due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) is known as the egalitarian equivalent solution and it captures the idea of giving "equal" shares of the surplus above equal splits. In this solution, an agent's surplus at an allocation is measured by the fraction of the total resource that she views as just equivalent to the given allocation. An egalitarian equivalent allocation is one where this fraction is the same for all agents. An egalitarian equivalent solution due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) is a feasible egalitarian equivalent allocation whose corresponding fraction is the largest among all feasible egalitarian equivalent allocations. This paper has similar concerns but (once again) in the context of package assignment problems. At the outset it needs to be realized that talking about fractions of the total resource is meaningless when the resource is indivisible. We do not have the facility of convexity that the original model enjoyed. Hence we measure the surplus of an agent at an allocation by the fraction of her willingness to pay for the total resource that is equal to the monetary worth of her consumption at the allocation. An egalitarian equivalent allocation is one for which this fraction is the same for all agents. We call this common fraction the egalitarian equivalence factor (of the allocation). An egalitarian equivalent allocation as defined here is a generalization of an equitable allocation due to Brams and Taylor (1996) . An egalitarian equivalent solution is a feasible egalitarian equivalent allocation whose egalitarian equivalence factor maximizes the egalitarian equivalence factor among all such allocations (i.e. among all feasible egalitarian equivalent allocations). Our first result shows that an egalitarian equivalent solution exists and it is efficient. It may be conjectured that the proof of this result would be identical to the proof of the corresponding result due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) . That this is not the case follows from the fact that due to indivisibilities we are prevented from making arbitrarily small transfers of non-monetary commodities among the agents. Further, there is no natural bound on the possible monetary transfers we can make among the agents. The two proofs are analogous but materially different. The final result of this paper shows that the egalitarian solution satisfies what we may refer to as "fair share guaranteed" property. In the divisible good context it is also known as individual rationality fro equal division. Moulin (1995) contains a discussion of this property including its definitions for assignment problems. The first question that arises is: How do we define it for package assignment problems? We attempt an answer along the following lines. What would a typical agent 'i' consider as an equal division of the total resources? It seems reasonable that equal division of her willingness to pay for the total resource is a good candidate. Accepting this as our benchmark, we propose that any reasonable solution to a fair division problem should allocate each agent at least what she perceives to be an equal division of the total resource. We call this property "fair share guaranteed" and show that the egalitarian equivalent solution satisfies this property. In the fair division literature, "fair share guaranteed" is also known as "proportionality" (see Brams and Taylor (1996) for instance). The egalitarian equivalent solution thus shares with several others a property that is desirable for equitable distribution of resources. This paper is an attempt to extend received theory of distributive justice to the domain of package assignment problems. There is far too much about this domain that is already known to suggest that its structure is remarkably different from distribution problems with homogeneous and divisible commodities. At the same time there is not enough known about several conventional solution concepts that have been defined in the context of fair allocation of divisible goods. This is precisely what makes this paper possible.
The Model: Let Z + = ∪{0}, where denotes the set of natural numbers. Let there be H > 0 agents and L+1 > 1 commodities, the last one of which is money. The first L commodities are non-monetary consumption goods. Money is both consumed as well as used as a measure of worth/value. Let w∈ L Z + denote the aggregate initial endowment of the non-monetary goods which is available for distribution among the agents. For j = 1,…,L, let w j denote the aggregate amount of commodity j that is initially available in the economy. We shall refer to elements of An allocation is a pair (z,t) such that z is a non-monetary allocation and t∈ℜ H denotes a vector of transfers to the agents. A feasible allocation (z,t) is said to be efficient if z is an efficient non-monetary allocation. A feasible allocation (z,t) is said to be envy free if for all i, k = 1,…,H:
Thus, (z,t) is envy free implies that there is a real number τ(z) (i.e. possibly depending on z) such that for all i = 1,…,H: |t i | ≤τ(z). Since for a package assignment problem the number of non-monetary allocations is finite, we get the following observation. There exists a real number τ such that if (z,t) is envy free then: |t i | ≤τ. ) is a MEEI. It is well-known that if L > 1 then no market equilibrium, let alone one from equal incomes need exist for a package assignment problem. If L = 1, then a MEEI exists under very reasonable assumptions on the willingness to pay functions of the agents. However if a package assignment problem admits an MEEI allocation then (as may be easily verified) such an allocation would be both envy-free and efficient. An allocation (z,t) that is both envy-free and efficient is said to be fair. The non-existence of MEEI allocations for package assignment problems means that a certain desirable type of fair allocation(s) cannot be guaranteed in our framework.
A price vector p is an element of
Fair Allocations: It is well known that if there is just one unit of every commodity that is initially available and each agent can consume at most one commodity at a time, then a fair allocation always exists. Moulin (1995) (Corollary to Theorem 4.1) uses this result to elegantly establish that for package assignment problems a fair allocation always exists. In fact the result that Moulin uses to prove the corollary permits the following stronger version of the existence result a proof of which (due to Aragones (1992)) is being provided for completeness. Hence for the purpose of calculating r i we can omit all cycles from a sequence and consider sequences of distinct indices and the one element sequence {q ii }. Since the number of such sequences is finite it must be the case that r i > -∞. Since q ii = 0, r i ≤ 0.
Consider the vector of transfers t * , where
It is balanced, i.e. The following observation concerning envy-free allocations for a package assignment problem is noteworthy. 
Proof: Suppose that for all (coalitions) S,T ⊂ {1,…,H} with S, T ≠ φ:
Then taking |S| = |T| = 1 it follows that (z 
for all i∈S.
The desired inequality in Claim 1 follows by taking the sum of the last inequalities over i∈S. Q.E.D.
Non-Linear Market Equilibrium:
A non-linear price function, or simply a pricing function(to put it briefly) is a function P:C(w)→ℜ + such for x∈C(w), P(x) is the price of the non-monetary consumption bundle x. Faced with a pricing function P, an agent chooses a consumption bundle in C(w) that maximizes his willingness to pay minus the price of the bundle. A pair (P, (z * , t * )) where P is a pricing function and (z * , t * ) an efficient allocation is said to be a Non-linear Market Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (NMEEI) if for all i = 1,…,H:
In a recent paper by Wellman and Wurman (undated), it has been claimed that in every package assignment problem, where there is exactly one unit of each good available, a non-linear market equilibrium exists. In view of Proposition 1 we are able to establish a stronger result that says, given any efficient non-monetary allocation, we can find a pricing function and a corresponding balanced vector of transfers, in conformity with the requirements of a NMEEI. Egalitarian Equivalent Solutions: An allocation (z,t) is said to be egalitarian equivalent if there exists λ 0 such that for all i = 1,…,n: t i + f i (z i ) = λf i (w). The real number λ is said to be the egalitarian equivalence factor for (z,t). ) is an egalitarian equivalent solution if it is feasible, egalitarian equivalent and its egalitarian equivalence factor exceeds that of any other egalitarian equivalent allocation.
Proposition 3: Given any package assignment problem, we can always find an egalitarian equivalent solution for it. Further, such a solution is always efficient.
Proof: Suppose (z,t) is an egalitarian equivalent allocation and suppose its egalitarian equivalence factor exceeds one. If (z,t) were feasible, then we would get / k∈ℵ> must be a bounded sequence. Hence it admits a convergent subsequence. Further since the number of feasible non-monetary allocations are finite, there exists a non-monetary allocation z which repeats itself infinitely often in <z (k) / k∈ℵ>. Thus there exists a subsequence of <(z (k) , t (k) )/ k∈ℵ> which converges to a feasible allocation (z,t). 
